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Abstract
It is shown that the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics
being refered back to Feynman-Wheeler’s time reversal symmetric radiation
theory has reminiscences to our complex action model. In this complex ac-
tion model the initial conditions are in principle even calculable. Thus it
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philosophically points towards superdeterminism, but really the Bell theorem
problem is solved in our model of complex action by removing the significance
of signals running slower than by light velocity.
Our model as earlier published predicts that LHC should have some failure
before reaching to have produced as many Higgs-particles as would have been
produced the SSC accelerator. In the present article, we point out that a
cardgame involving whether to restrict LHC-running as we have proposed to
test our model will under all circumstances be a success.
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1 Introduction
In the previous articles [1] we proposed that one should use the LHC-machine to
look for backward causation effects. Indeed, we proposed a model [1, 2, 3, 4] in which
the realized history of the universe was selected so as to minimize a certain functional
of the history, a functional being the imaginary part of the action SI [history], which
only exists in our model. In general, it is assumed in science that there is no
pre-arrangement [5] of initial conditions so as to make special events occur or not
occur later. However J. Bell proposed in BBC radio broadcast as a solution to the
problems of Einstein - Podlosky - Rosen’s “super-determinism” [6] and even more it
has been developping to the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics [7],
which involves Feynman-Wheeler’s radiation theory[8] that has backward causation
in its formalism.
Also, one of the present authors (H.B.N.) and his group earlier proposed models
nonlocal in time (and space) [9, 10, 11]. Similar backward causation effects have
also been proposed in connection with the story that e. g. humanity would cause
a new vacuum to appear, “vacuum bomb,” by one of the present authors (H.B.N.)
and collaborators [12].
Our proposal is to test if there should perhaps be such pre-arrangements in na-
ture, that is, pre-arrangements that prevent Higgs particle producing machines, such
as LHC and SSC, from being functional. Our model with an imaginary part of the
action [1, 14] begins with a series of not completely convincing, but still suggestive,
assumptions that lead to the prediction that large Higgs producing machines should
turn out not to work in that history of the universe, which is actually being realized.
The main points of the present article are the following two points:
A) To argue that our “model with imaginary action”[1-4] is a very natural type
of model if one decides to go for Bell’s proposal of superdeterminism [6] or the
transactional interpretation.
B) To argue that by making the type of experiment testing our model by a card
game about the putting restrictions on the running of LHC can only seem to
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be successfull.
These points will be explained below:
A) The point of superdeterminism is to overcome the trouble of the Bell’s theorem
with quantum mechanics and very general assumptions of locality, by discarding the
assumption that the experimentalists in each of the entanglement connected objects
have a “free will” to choose what they want to measure. Rather the idea is that
they could NOT have chosen to measure anything different from what they indeed
go to measure. I.e. it is at least as if the decision of these experimentalists were
fixed so that it could perhaps even be something that were in principle calculable.
At least it should not be allowed to argue about other possibilities for their choice of
measurements to perform than the ones they really do choose. In that case of course
the whole story of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen or equivalently Bell’s theorem has
no point. If you only measure whatever you measure it is only that element of reality
that corresponds to that which is relevant and no paradoxes come in.
Since our model leads in the classical approximation to be a model even for
the initial conditions so that indeed everything get determined by in principle - but
not in practice – from pure calculations only using the coupling constants including
their imaginary parts as input is an eclatant example of superdeterminsim (at laest
classsically). We want to argue in section 2 below that indeed something like our
model is strongly called for by the problems of measurement theory, as is also stated
in the proceedings at the Vexjo conference by one of us [13].
B) The plan behind the practical experiment, which we proposed, was to produce
some random numbers–partly by drawing cards and partly by quantum random
number generation – and then let these random numbers be translated, according
to the rules of the game, into some restrictions on the luminosity or the energy or
both of the LHC. Thus LHC might, for instance, only be allowed to run up to a
certain beam energy. I. Stewart [14] proposed that pauses are determined by random
numbers.
The idea is merely to require any restriction at all for LHC with probability p
that is deemed, by the rules of the game, to be very small. The probability p for a
“close LHC” card is p ∼ 10−6 or so [1].
It is clear that even a small probability restriction enforced on LHC, its lumi-
nosity or beam energy, means an artificially imposed – one would say, ignoring our
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type of model – risk for the LHC project.
It is, however, the main focus of the present paper to point out (as was briefly
stated in the previous article [1]) that even though our proposed project of restricting
LHC according to random numbers seems to give rise to a loss, in fact, whatever
happens seems – initially at least – to be a gain, a success!
That a success in this sense is guaranteed to be the result seemingly with almost
100% certainty (but in reality not quite 100%) is demonstrated in the present article.
The point really is that seeing any restriction coming up from a card game of a
type that should happen with probability of 10−6 is already evidence for our model,
which would thus be discovered by such a card draw.
Of course the whole excercise of making the proposed card game experiment
looking for some backward causation of the type we propose would be futile if such
an effect were already excluded by earlier experiments. If indeed we should look
for completely disaterous bad luck for any attempt to produce just a single Higgs
particle, presumably the Tevatron of FNAL in Chicago would already present a
counter example. Although not a single Higgs particle has been safely recognized
to have been produced at the Tevatron one expects that according to theoretical
expectations in say Standard Model several thousands of them would alresdy have
been produced, although even that is not sufficient for a discovery, since only ex-
clusions of mass regions so far were found. But the LHC accelerator as well as the
SSC would, if working, produce much more Higgf particles in the long run than the
Tevaron. So it is certainly a possibility that the effect causing backward particles
achieved in the LHC and the in 1993 stopped SSC, while being insignificant in the
Tevatron case.
It has also been proposed that the mere observation of cosmic rays with sufficient
energy so as to even on fixed target produce Higgs particles should represent an
argument against the possibility of the effect we propose to investigate. However,
although we certainly would, if such an effect existed, predict that the amount
of cosmic rays with such energies would be reduced by the backward causation
effect, one might imagine that sources of cosmic rays might be directed to send
their radiation in the direction of regions with low density of stars and planets so
as to avoid Higgs production, but we do not have sufficient statistics to have any
measurement of whether there should –say 300,000 Higgses– statisically be any effect
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of that type; for that our understanding of what the amount of cosmic rays without
there being such an effect is too poor.
2 Relation of Super-determinism to our complex
action model
We have already remarked in the introduction that in our complex action model
the imaginary part of the action comes to play the role of determining the initial
conditions. If we indeed denote the complex action
S [path] = SR [path] + iSI [path] , (1)
where SR and SI are then the real and imaginary parts respectively we have approx-
imately that among all the solutions to the classical equations of motion in ignoring
the imaginary part approximation
δSR = 0, (2)
the solution with the minimal (i. e. most negative) SI [sol] is the one which we live
through (i. e. the one realized). That is to say the formula in our complex action
model for the history of the universe to be selected as the one realized becomes
SI [sol ] will be minimal. (3)
The fact that we have such a formula – wherein the mathematical expression for SI
in terms of the field(development)s is very similar and analogous to the usual Stan-
dard Model action expression, except that the coefficients deviate – for the realized
history sol means that even the initial conditions (contained in sol) are calculable
in principle, although not in practice. With such a model as ours in which one thus
can calculate “everything” in principle one can especially imagine calculating the
choice of the experimentalists in an EPS(=Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) type of exper-
iment would perform on the particles that were separated in this experiment. Let us
remind the reader that in the EPS or Bell-theorem type of experiment a couple of
quanta(=particles) are produced in a correlated (entangled) state and successively
these particles separate to run in different directions. Further away whereto these
separated particles run two different experimentalists teams with their detections
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determine measure properties of the particles. It is important that these experimen-
talists, if they have “free will”, can make their decisions about what properties to
measure, the spin component along what direction say, or momentum or position,
after the particles are already widely separated. Of course in our model with com-
plex action, like in even just usual deterministic models, the “free will” will only
be something in our fantasies, since we could in our model in principle even have
calculated what their choices of quantities to be measured would be.
The problem with quantum mechanics associated with Bell’s Theorem is that
under mild assumptions, mainly that no signal can go arbitrarily fast from the
one measurement place to the other one so as to communicate the experimentalists
choice, the quantum mechanical statistical predictions are not consistent. If one
takes the point of view that we only need to consider the truly realized situation,
i. e. choice of experiments measuring on the particles, but can ignore totally the
“only fantasy” possibilities associated with the make up of a “free will” feeling for
the experimentalists, then Bell’s theorem falls away and quantum mechanics has no
Bell’s theorem problem.
Thus logically we may say that our model even strengthens the application of
superdeterminism to escape the Bell’s theorem problem. We say that our model
strengthens the superdeterminism because it makes the initial state and thus the
deterministically determined experimentalist decisions even calculable, so that a
requirement that we should be allowed to vary at least the initial conditions in
deriving Bell’s theorem requirements would no longer hold in our model.
Now, however, we shall argue in the next section that in spite of our model in this
way strengthening the ground for superdeterminism, it is in fact another feature of
our model that removes the Bell’s theorem troubles in it. In fact the point is rather
that once we have effectively backward causation – so that e. g. the potential switch
on of SSC to produce many Higgs bosons can backwardly cause the Congress of the
United States to stop the funding – then the rule that a signal cannot move with
arbitrarily high speed no longer makes sense. The signal could instead move slowly
along in the future and then go backward in time using the feature of backward
causation in our model.
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3 Analysis of the way our model solves the EPS-
Bell’s Theorem problem
Really as Bell himself were aware – and why he thus did not like superdeter-
minism as the way out for quantum mechanics – there can be a lot of small details
going on in an in practice very hard to control way and these details can influence
the experimentalist’s decisions. Such details are e. g. the reasoning in their brains
and really may well represent their “free will”. We believe that indeed a superde-
terminism solution solving the Bell’s theorem problem for quantum mechanics by
postulating that even these “free will” – simulating details leading forward to the
experimentalist’s decisions can be somehow integrated up and calculated through
by the particle choosing its property when measured is a somewhat unhealthy phi-
losophy. How should indeed a particle say B at site B where a measurement is made
“know” and “understand” the contemplations in detail of the experimentalists at
the other site A ? It sounds healthier to make an assumption that such detailed
calculations as the ones in the experimentalists of team A cannot get calculated
through at the observation site B. Supplementing quantum mechanics with locality
etc by such a reasonable extra postulate the loophole in the Bell’s theorem trouble
for quantum mechanics would be closed. With such an extra reasonable assumption
quantum mechanics would be truly in trouble. Our strengthening by making the
initial state “calculable” in principle will a prior not help much against the reason-
able assumption suggested. So as far as the true superdeterminism solution to the
Bell’s theorem problem for quantum mechanics our model does not help much.
There is, however, another way in which our model may help more realisti-
cally quantum mechanics against the Bell’s theorem problem. Since the formula
SI [history]minimal has in the integral form
SI [history] =
∫
all times
LI (history(t)) dt (4)
contributions from all times, from the beginning of times to the end, it also includes
contributions from what is future for us to say. In order that our model shall have
a chance of being viable we must of course hope or speculate that e. g. because of
the special conditions in the inflation time, the contributions to SI [history] from
LI (history(t)) for time t in the inflation era were by far the most important, so that
8
what happened in the inflation-era dominated the selection of what history were the
one to be realized (to be the one we live through now). Only with such an assumption
of the inflation-era contribution to the SI =
∫
LIdt integral dominating the selection
of the initial conditions (the solution) will agree with our normal experience with
second law of thermodynamics, meaning that only the start were strongly organized
in the sense of having low entropy and essentially nothing being prearranged by
having fine tuned initial conditions destined to make future thing happen. However,
in our complex action model there should be at least some seeming attempts to
such prearrangements, meaning that there is in our model in principle happening
events not expected statistically in the usual theory, so that one might denote them
as “miracles” or “antimiracles” if it is something bad. Usually, however, we expect
that the contributions from the era such as the inflation era around the “Big Bang”
time (if there were a Big Bang) would dominate.
When, however, we consider a quantum experiment with a measurement, the
result of which seemingly independently of the initial conditions can with finite none-
zero probabilities obtain different measured values, it becomes suggestive that the
future contribution
∫∞
texp
LIdt could become important where text denotes the time
the experiment is performed. We therefore in our model suppose that the outcome
of a quantum experiment is not a priori just pure fortuitousness or accident, but
actually depends on the (future) contribution to the imaginary part of the action∫∞
texp
LIdt. That is to say, we expect that the outcome of the measurement is that
result which minimizes the contributions
∫∞
texp
LIdt to SI depending on this outcome.
If we have, as we now assume about our model, a theory in which the outcome of
a quantum measurement is selected by minimizing an integral
∫∞
texp
LIdt extending
into the far away future for the whole world, then the worry about signals going
between the sites A and B for the measurements in the EPS-type experiment faster
than light or arbitrarily fast looses its interest. The point namely is that the to avoid
Bell’s theorem troubles needed faster than light signals can be replaced by signals
reaching the future of the particles measured upon, because it is the future of the
particle (roughly speaking) that determines the result of the quantum measurement.
Really it is not so much the future of the particle itself as of the results of the
measurement as propagated by publications etc into the future that matters for
the
∫∞
texp
LIdt integral to be minimized for telling the result of the measurement.
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You might describe this picture of the measurement results being determined by
minimizing the future part of the imaginary part of the action SI , called
∫∞
texp
LIdt,
crudely as the information first going forward in time where it all the way contributes
to
∫∞
texp
LIdt and cause what we call backward causation an influence backward in
time determining the measurement results.
To make clearer the way our model treats the Bell’s theorem situation, we could
hypothetically imagine that the two sites of measurement A and B were kept in
all the future isolated. Then the measurement results, in our model determined
(in a complicated way) from the future integral contribution
∫∞
texp
LIdt, could not
get correlated. In other words, the anti Bell’s theorem strange correlation (or any
correlation) between the measurement results provided the two sites A and B have
a common future, which can contribute to
∫∞
texp
LIdt and thereby make the mini-
mization of this integral provide the correlation.
This “explanation” of the violation of Bell’s theorem by the future contributions
to SI , i. e.
∫∞
texp
LIdt, deciding the measurement results in our model is nicer than
the genuine superdeterminism, because it does not require the complicated con-
templations of the experimentalist teams to be “known” and “understood” by any
particles.
Really the usual Copenhagen interpretation (or Born) rule is approximately re-
produced in our model by making an approximation
| B(t) 〉〈B(t) |∼ 1, (5)
where the ket | B(t) > and its bra < B(t) | is given by a functional integral over the
exponentiated action from the after texp era only
Safter texp =
∫ ∞
texp
Ldt. (6)
I. e. we defined previously in a basis consisting of basis vectors |~q >,
〈~q | B(t)〉 =ˆ
∫
with conditions path(t)=~q
e
i
~
Safter(t)(path) Dpath. (7)
(paths from path texp to∞)
We thus see that although everything even what really happens and what gets
measured is in our model (super) determined in the sense that it is even in principle
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calculable, the important way in which our model can be claimed to solve the prob-
lem with Bell’s theorem is rather that it by having dependence on the future via
the integral
∫∞
texp
LIdt gets information/ a signal backward in time to determine the
outcome of the measurement. After such a backward in time signalling is allowed,
the locality principle formally implemented by the (complex) action being of the
form
S [path] =
∫
L (path(x), ∂path(x))
√
gdx, (8)
where the Lagrangian density L (path(x), ∂path(x)) only depends on the field de-
velopment called path in the infinitesimal neighborhood of the spacetime point x,
i. e. on path(x) and its first derivatives ∂path(x), can still be compatible with an
effective arbitrarily fast information transfer. It is by means of backward causation
via the
∫∞
texp
LIdt dependence our model – in a somewhat reasonable thinkable way
– circumvents one of the assumptions behind the Bell’s theorem and thus its trouble
for quantum mechanics.
4 The Trasnactional Interpretation
There is another proposal for quantum mechanics interpretation, which is even
more similar to ours than the just discussed superdeterminism, and that is the
transactional interpretation In fact this transactional interpretation has formally
the interesting common feature with our model: Formal influence from the future.
In the transactional interpretation this formal backward causation or influence
from the future is at least clearly alluded to by the fact that the transactional in-
terpretation on the Feynman-Wheeler electrodynamics. In this Feynman-Wheeler
theory of electrodynamics the usual boudary conditions used to derive electromag-
netic radiation to be described by retarded waves is replaced by a time reversal
invariant boundary condition. This Feynman-Wheeler postulate is that an electri-
cally charged object sends out both a retarded and an advanced contribution to
the electromagnetic fields so that the total emission is time reversal invariant. This
means that formally fields propagate both backward and forward in time. Thus
formally the Feynman-Wheeler theory has influence from the future built into it. It
is nontrivial in their theory to argue that in practice we obtain seemingly only the
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retarded waves, and the argumentation does not work in all cosmological pictures.
It is namely based on a discussion in which the absorber of the light is strongly
needed.
When therefore the transactional interpretation is based on the wave function for
the photon (∼essentially the electromagnetic field) is influenced by charged matter
in just the way proposed by Feynman-Wheeler it looks a priori as if the transactional
interpretation is also easily going to contain influence from the future. However, it
is claimed by the proponents of the transactional interpretation by Cramer [7] that
one can distinguish a strong and weak principle of causality. The weak principle
of causality which only claims that a cause shall come before the effect when it
applies to macroscopic observations and observer–to– observer communication. But
Cramer claims: there is no present experimental evidence in support of any causal
principle stronger than the “weak principle”. To this interpretation even opens up
for backward causation on the microlevel, since strong causality is not hold up.
Another point pointing towards our model of complex action is the occurrence of
two wave functions: OW (“offer wave”) and CW (“confirmation wave”). This has
similarities to the 〈q|A(t)〉 and 〈B(t)|q〉 wave functions defined in our functional
integral based on “complex action model” by the following “half time” functional
integrals
〈q|A(t)〉 =
∫
with boundary
conditions
q′=path(t).
e
i
~
∫
t
−∞(beginning) L(path,∂path)dtDpath(half), (9)
and
〈B(t)|q′〉 =
∫
e
i
~
∫
∞
t
L(path, dpath
dt
dtDpath(half). (10)
4.1 More review of transactional interpretation
As far as we understand the point of the transactional model is that echoes of
advanced waves responding retarded and advanced considered in a pedagogical time
finally leads to a total field which obey:
a) the usual type of boundory condictions of no wave before emission and no
wave after absorbtion.
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b) some quantization condictions, e.g. supposedly that the energy is given by a
Planck quantization rule.
We must think about it that the field being nonzero region gets concentrated
along a narrow track in space(time) connecting the emmitter to the absorber. If this
is a correct interpretation of the transactional model then we see that the direction of
motion of the emitted photon is from the start geared to reach its absorption place,
the absorber. But that means that it is indeed strongly influenced by the future.
This is of course what is expected in a model based on the backward causality
containing Feynman-Wheeler theory. It means, at least, that in principle now the
influence from future has sneaked into the transactional interpretation scheme, then
it may turn out to not be there macroscopically at the end though.
4.2 Is our complex action model equivalent to the transac-
tional interpretation?
Although both our model of complex action and the transactional interpretation
model are both characterized by influence from the future, they are not exactly the
same, since we have different details for the influence from the future. In fact, there
is in our model in principle a series of parameters in the form of the imaginary part
of the action SI =
∫
LIdt to be chosen, before we have a definite model, while in
the transactional interpretation model one uses the Feynman-Wheeler time reversal
symmetric emission-rule (∼ boundary condition) to tell how future influences past.
But in a general way we may bring the correspondence between the two models
to be very close each other indeed. Presumably the best way to make the correspon-
dence be there is to use the second quantized theory in the field theory language in
the functional integral taken as fundamental in our model.
That is to say, we take our abstract “path” to mean a thinkable develop of all
the fields (supposed for simplicity only bosonic fields ψ(Xµ)). This means that the
phase space – in this thinking on our model – is a space of infinitely many dimensions
the coordinates of which are partly the fields ψi( ~X) and partly their conjugate fields.
Now it is the crucial feature in our model with complex action and use action
integral over all time (including both all past and all future) that the initial condi-
tions or rather a solution to the equations of motion gets field (and is in principle
13
calculable). This classical solution singled out by means of the imaginary action SI
being minimal is a classical solution describing a path through all times. It thus
even in principle makes it possible to calculate the outcome of quantum experiments
(in our complex action model). Thinking upon this model with the fields as the vari-
ables describing the path we get thus our model to – up to a few small splittings
of the track – deliver as in prinsiple (but not in practice) a classical solution to the
field development. But now such a classical field development is what from the only
quantized point of view is a specific development of the wave function. This wave
function now can be considered as it is in the transactional interpretation just an
ordinary (meaning well-defined classical) field! In this way you can say that our
complex action model taken as a theory for the fields deliver just the picture of the
transactional interpretation.
4.3 How comes single quantization about?
With such a making the wave function or say better the fields become classical
solutions one might become worried about how we can get say the quantization of
the energy of a photon by ~ω, where ω is the frequency.
In our model it cannot really come about unless we allow that there typically
will be more than just classical solutions selected, but rather a discrete series of
rather close to each other solutions. In the case of a photon being transmitted from
some emitter to an absorber over a long (space and) distance these close to each
other but different classical solutions –still relevant/contributing to our functional
integral– would be solutions within a range of close by numbers of turns in the os-
cillations of the field from emitter to absorber. But now each extra turn in the field
oscillation will give an extra phase factor in our “fundamental” functional integral.
These different “neighboring” routes will only add up constructively provided the
total phase difference between the contributions from the different classical (field)
solutions happen to be (at least approximately) zero. Such a condition for construc-
tive interference between contributions in the Wentzel-Dirac-Feynman integral from
various only a but from each other deviating classical solutions could lead to the
quantization rule in the single quantized language.
It seems that in the transactional interpretation the quantization of energy and
momentum is imposed as an extra condition without any explanation behind it.
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That would correspond to our model if one would make quantization without
having our functional integral on a level more fundamental, then namely the phase-
factor from the behind functional integration would have no place in the picture.
One would have to put it on extra as a kind of Bohr-quantization condition.
4.4 What to conclude from the tight connection of our
model with transactional interpretation?
One can look at the close coincidence of our complex action model with transac-
tional interpretation in two opposite directions: Believing transactional interpreta-
tion and show that it is a model “of our type” thus supporting such models. Or one
could oppositely believe in our model and say that derive not exactly the conven-
tional model of transactional interpretation, but a transactional interpretation type
model. The latter does not necessarily have the Feynman-Wheeler’s specific way of
sending equal strength wave retardedly and advanced, but which in the important
“philosophical” aspects would be just the same: The wave functions (in the single
particle picture) could be considered ordinary (∼classical) fields, there would be
influence from the future so that a particle would be guided in the right direction
from the start in say Renninger’s negative result experiment.
5 What we need
Even though it is not so much the superdeterminism in our model in the sense
of everything being calculable in principle that makes it compatible with the Bell’s
theorem and quantum mechanics as its lack of information only going forward in time
as usual that causes the compatibility of our model with quantum mechanics and
locality our model is nevertheless supported by the troubles of quantum mechanics.
We could generally state that clearly any theory with backward causation like
our model would potentially be able to circumvent the Bell’s theorem troubles by
via the future forth and back allowing an effect/a signal to go effectively faster than
light. Such potential theories with backward causation it would be able to solve
the Bell’s theorem trouble. This type of “theory” could be claimed to be supported
by the quantum mechanics Bell’s theorem trouble. This fact makes it especially
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important to look for any backward causation effects whenever there should be
a chance for it. Since we have so far only rather weak evidence for if any even
very seldom prearranged events it seems that usual daily life physics should show
extremely little backward causation in any viable physics theory. However for much
higher energy per particle than in daily life physics we may have yet looked less
carefully for prearranged events (∼ miracles). It is therefore to be suggested that,
e. g. to look for a possible way out of the Bell’s theorem problem, one should at each
new accelerator look for prearranged events.
If the prearranging governing (e.g. via the initial conditions) of the world were
made to arrange for or arrange for avoiding some phenomenon happening due to
high energy accelerators of some sort, the easiest (least miraculous) way to arrange
for or avoid such a phenomenon might be to favour or disfavour the very building
of the accelerator.
As the example which is favoured by speculations in our model of complex action
it could be that there is a special type of particle which if produced will contributes
especially much to e.g. disfavour the accelerator producing it. If so then the type of
accelerator producing this type of particle – especially if in large numbers – should be
prearranged not to come to work for long time in the mode producing the many such
particles. In our model, we suggest that the type of particle causing the disfavour
and giving thus especially bad luck for the running of the accelerator is the Higgs
boson, because we think that the term . . . +m2h |I · | φH |2 + . . . in the imaginary
part of Lagrangian density
LI(x) = . . .+m
2
h |I · | φH |2 + . . . , (11)
is dominant from a dimensional argument. The imaginary part of the Lagrangian
density LI(x) is of course the space time density for the imaginary part of the action
SI [path] =
∫
over all space time incl.
past and future
LI (x, path(x))
√
g d4x. (12)
Our “dimensional argument” is that if the natural units were the Planck units
the natural value for quantity m2h |I having dimension of mass square would be
the Planck mass mPL ∼ 1019GeV squared, i.e. m2h |I∼ (1019GeV )2 ∼ 1038GeV =
1032TeV 2 which is tremendously large from the point of view of LHC-physics.
If an accelerator indeed has the potentiality of producing many of such “hated” or
bad luck giving new particles we might observe it by investigating statistically if the
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accelerators meet bad or good luck technically and politically. Here immediately the
reader should think of the biggest potential (putative?) accelerator the SSC having
been stopped in 1993 by the Congress.
As we have already suggested in earlier papers it might be difficult to get a clean
statistical investigation of the potential bad luck unless one makes a very clean
experiment by betting a card game preferably combined with quantum random
numbers decide whether a certain accelerator – of course we propose it to be LHC
– be brought to run and at what luminousity and energy.
6 Card game for LHC restrictions can only be a
success!
There are two possibilities.
1) You draw a card combination of the most common type leading to no re-
strictions. Then LHC can run without any restriction and you can be totally
happy because you found, with close to zero expense, an argument against our
theory. You almost kill our theory, or at least drastically diminish the chance
that it is right. This is a very good scenario!
2) You draw a restriction card combination. Now, it is a significant loss that
LHC cannot run in full, but now you have proved our, or a similar, backward
causation theory. This would be so interesting, if one really had backward
causation, that it might be counted as a discovery greater than supersymmetric
partners or the finding of the Higgs. It would be a fantastic discovery made
with LHC! If the restriction drawn is not a total closing, you would likely soon
also find the Higgs and perhaps the supersymmetric partners even if statistics
might initially be a bit worse than hoped for.
It would be a wonderful victory for CERN and LHC to find backward causation
together with having to obey the most likely very mild restrictions. We should
remember that the rule of our card game should be to make the milder restriction
have a much higher chance of being drawn than the very strong restriction of, for
example, totally closing LHC.
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Quite correctly, there is, though a little chance of, a true loss even though it
will not be initially noticed. It is possible, although not likely, that a random
number game leads to a restriction even if our model, and any model with backward
causation, is wrong. In this case, we have a bad bargain: not only would we loose the
full applicability of LHC, but we would also have gotten, by a statistical fluctuation,
the wrong impression that a backward causation containing model were indeed true
without this actually being the case.
We should certainly arrange the restriction probability p to be low enough to
make this bad case have a very low probability.
One would, from this way of arguing, initially suspect that it would be most
profitable not to perform our random number LHC restricting experiment because
if our theory were right LHC would, in any case, be closed or restricted somehow
by prearranged bad luck, as happened to SSC, for which Congress in the U.S.A.
terminated economic support. Now, however, we want to argue that it would be
more agreeable to have LHC be stopped or restricted by a random number game
rather than by some bad luck such as political withdrawal of support. The main
reason for the artificially caused random number withdrawal being preferred is that
we would, in this case, get more solid support for our, or a similar, model being true
than by the same restriction coming about through a bad luck accident.
To see that would be more convincingly shown the truth of our theory of imagi-
nary action determined by history if we have a card or random number closure rather
than a “normal” failure, we could contemplate how much more convincing our the-
ory would have been today if the SSC-machine had been closed after a random
number experiment rather than mainly for economical reasons or perhaps because
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which made the competition with 60 million
dollar accelerators not worthwhile.
Now it is sometimes explained that SSC [15] had bad luck because of various
stupidities or accidents, but had it been a card game such ideas would not matter.
Everything is an accident, but we would know the probabilities very reliably. So if
the card game were set up so that the closing probability were sufficiently small, we
would have been sure that the closing of SSC were due to a (anti)miracle.
In the following, we shall present a little calculational example to illustrate for-
mally that a more reliable knowledge of the truth of our theory is obtained with a
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random number experiment. This comes under the discussion of point 2) among the
reasons for conducting our proposed experiment later in the present article.
7 Reasons for conducting our proposed experi-
ment
What could be a reason to conduct the card game experiment?
1) To obtain greater conviction about the truth of our theory
– if it is true of course. –
2) To perhaps avoid bad backward causation effects.
These are the two benefits you could have.
In formula it would mean that we should estimate averages for the two measures
of these two benefits.
More conviction of truth of our model
For reason 1) – the conviction about our theory that it is indeed right – we need
some measure. Both the result of the card game and the failure of the LHC for
other reasons are statistical events, but, while we have very trustable ideas about
what probability p to assign to a given class of card combinations, our assignment of
a trustable value for the failure probability f for other reasons is very difficult and
has a huge uncertainly. Therefore, if LHC fails for a reason other than a random
number game, we would have not even truly learned that our theory was right even
though we would say “it is remarkable that the present authors wrote about the
failure while LHC still looked to be able to work.”
Miraculocity and estimating evidence for our model
In order to understand why the difference between getting our model supported
by a “natural ” failure of LHC and a failure caused merely by having a card game
drawing a “restrict LHC” card gives rise to an important difference in trustability
in our model. We shall give a slight formal illustration using the statistical model
which is not very exact but is appropriate for illustrating our point.
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If, in our model, a seemingly other reason for failure of LHC occurs merely
through the coincidence of a series of small bad luck events – that by themselves
can easily happen – then the number and unlikeliness of elements in this series of
bad luck events must be proportional to −ln f = |ln f | where f is the probability
of failure. We could call this quantity −ln f the “miraculocity” for failure in a
seemingly natural way. This concept of “miraculocity” becomes a measure for how
many “submiracles” must occur. As examples of submiracles, there are “the watch
man having drunk a bit too much”, “the connection between super conducting cables
having too high resistance”, “The accident being in the difficult part of the tunnel,
just under Jura mountain” etc.
Now if we set up a card or quantum mechanically based random number gen-
erator leading to “restrict LHC” with probability p , it needs to generate – by the
selection of the realized history in our model – a number of adjusted accidents (or
submiracles) in a number proportional to −ln p = |ln p| . Essentially, in the case of
the truth of our theory, whether the failure of the LHC will arise via the card or the
quantum random number game or via a natural reason will depend on which of the
two alternative miraculocities −ln p or −ln f is the smallest. There will, of course,
be a preference with “miraculocity”: the least miraculous of the two alternative
possibilities for failure will most likely be the one that occurs. This would require
fewest submiracles.
We can define f so that indeed −ln f gives a measure of the “miraculocity”,
but it is very difficult even for people building the LHC, to convincingly figure out
what to accept or predict about this miraculocity −ln f = |ln f | . At best, one can
predict it with an appreciable uncertainty. That is to say, we obtain, at least from
some simulation – say by Monte Carlo methods or just theoretically – a probability
distribution for “miraculocity” |ln f |. To illustrate our point of estimating the degree
of conviction, which we shall obtain in the case of a “natural” and / or “normal”
failure, we can assume that the probability calculation – by (computer) simulation
of the political and technical procedures around CERN and LHC – led to a Gaussian
distribution for the miraculocity −ln f . That is to say, we assume the probability
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distribution
P (|ln f |) d |ln f | =
≈ 1
σ
√
2π
exp
( 1
2σ2
(|ln f | − |ln f0|)2
)
d |ln f |.
(13)
Here, σ is the spread of the distribution for the logarithm of f , i.e., the “miracu-
locity.”
Now let us consider the degree of remarkableness for the failure depending on
whether it is due to the card or the quantum random number game or a “normal”
failure, i.e., other reasons such as meteors and bad electrical connection between the
superconductors.
In the case of a card or quantum random number game, the number of sub-
miracles in the card or quantum packing is proportional to −ln p, where p is the
arranged probability by the game rules.
However, if there is instead a “normal” failure due to the stupidity of some
members of cabinet or the like, then we would tend, of course, to believe that the
true miraculocity −ln f = |ln f | for that failure is indeed in the low end of the
estimated Gaussian distribution. In other words, we would expect that, after all,
the “true” probability for failure f is rather high, i.e., f > f0 or presumably even
f ≫ f0
Let us indeed evaluate the expected probability for a seemingly “normal” (i.e.,
not caused by card etc games) failure. This expected normal probability for failure
is
〈f〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
σ
√
2π
· f · exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(ln f − ln f0)2
)
d |ln f | (14)
(we imagine that the miscalculation by including the f > 1 region is negligible, but
one could of course do better if needed).
We immediately write f = e−|ln f |. We had hoped to expect “normal” failure
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with the probability given by
〈f〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
σ
√
2π
· exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(|ln f | − |ln f0|)2 − |ln f |
)
d |ln f |
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1
σ
√
2π
· exp
(
− 1
2σ2
[(|ln f | − |ln f0|+ σ2)2
−σ4 + 2σ2|ln fo|
])
d |ln f |
= exp
(
σ2
2
− |ln fo|
)
= fo e
σ2/2. (15)
Hence the remarkability or apparent miraculousness of the outcome that LHC
should fail seemingly by a “normal” accident – such as political closure – is not the
“miraculocity” corresponding to the most likely value for f , i.e., −ln fo = |ln fo|,
but rather to “remarkableness′′ = −ln 〈f〉 = |ln 〈f〉| = |ln fo| − σ22 .
It is this correction by the term −σ2
2
that causes less conviction for our model
being true if the failure of LHC shows up as a “normal” failure, than if we get a
failure caused by a card or quantum random number game. One should keep in
mind that whether in our model one or the other reasons for failure occurs depends
largely on the relative sizes of −ln f and −ln p .
In this way, it would be more convincing that our theory were true if the failure
were found by a card game or the like than by a “normal” failure of LHC. It would
thus be profitable scientifically if we could provoke a card game failure instead of
a “normal” one; we would have the possibility of arranging that if our model were
right. In the case of our model being wrong, of course, the card game project would
only add to the totally failure probability of LHC, making a card game a risk and a
bad thing.
Should our theory be right, the failure of LHC would be guaranteed with 2
3
probability, and in that case, the chance of total failure probability would not change
greatly whether we perform a card game project or not. In that case we would just
move some failure probability from the “normal” failure due to the card game or
the similar case.
If we place some economical value on the degree of confidence we would obtain
if our model were indeed true depending on whether one failure or another really
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occurred, we could put this benefit into the form
b1) = c · “remarkableness′′
= c ·
{
|ln p| if game failure
|ln 〈f〉| = |ln fo| − σ22 if “normal′′ failure.
(16)
In the case of our theory being right, which occurs with probability r, we esti-
mated that LHC would be stopped with 2
3
probability [1] so that this benefit will
be calculated as an average,
〈
b1)
〉
= c · “remarkableness′′
= c
〈(
p
f + p
|ln p|+ f
f + p
(
|ln fo| − σ
2
2
))
r
2
3
〉
Gauss
, (17)
where the average 〈· · · 〉Gauss is merely the average over distribution (13) .
For instance, in the limit of a very small probability p assigned to the random
number restricting LHC, we would get
〈
b1)
〉 ≈ c(|ln fo| − σ2
2
)
r · 2
3
+ cp
〈
1
f
〉(
|ln p| − |ln fo|+ σ
2
2
)
r
2
3
+ . . . . (18)
If, on the other hand, we set p≫ 〈f〉, we would get
〈
b1)
〉 ≈
(
|ln p|+ 〈f〉
p
(
|ln fo| − σ
2
2
− |ln p|
))
r · 2
3
. (19)
It is important to notice that, as the previous discussion suggested, the correction
term in (18) will, for small enough p, give increasing benefit with increasing p so
that it would be beneficial w.r.t. this benefit b1) of attaining an increase in the safety
of our knowledge that p is not completely zero in our model.
8 Avoiding bad backwardly caused events
In our earlier paper, we included, in our estimates of whether it would pay to
perform our card game or random number game experiment, the consideration that
if we indeed have backward causation for LHC becoming inoperable, then these pre-
arrangements could have side effects that might be bad and, a priori, perhaps also
good. The backward causation effects might end up being huge in much the same
way as the famous forward causation effect of the butterfly in the “butterfly effect”,
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but in the same way as it is difficult to predict whether the effects are good or bad
when the butterfly beats its wings in a particular way, it is hard to know if the pre-
arrangements set up to prevent LHC from working are good or bad. If we think of
such possibilities as the closure of CERN or an earthquake in Geneva, we may judge
it to be bad, but if we think of even earlier or further distant pre-arrangements, it
becomes increasingly difficult to estimate either good or bad. For instance, it is a
possibility that a major factor behind the SSC being terminated by Congress was
the collapse of the Soviet Union [16]. This were a huge backward causation effect
but it is hard to evaluate the probability as to whether it is good or bad. Thus, it
would have been hard to evaluate, in advance, whether our card game would have
been profitable had our theory been known then.
In the previous articles [1], we called the price of the damage arising in excess
when a “normal” failure of LHC is provoked, d .
We should imagine that the very huge backward causation effects occurring very
remotely from the LHC are probably averaged out to zero, similar to the far future
effects of the butterfly wing. Hence the important contributions to the damage cost
d are rather close in time (and space) to the LHC itself. We very roughly estimated,
in our previous study, d ≈ 10· “cost of LHC” ≃ 10 · 3.3 · 109 CHF = 3.3 · 1010 CHF.
In the case of the card game failure, there may also be huge effects, but now
the evaluation of the damage being good or bad would be totally opaque. Only the
effects of performing the actual experiment may have any predictable average effect.
Therefore, in the case of such an artificial failure, the damage would be limited to
statistically washing out damage (i.e., they are equally likely to be good or bad) and
the obvious loss because of the restriction on the d rest.loss card drawn.
We should arrange the latter damage to almost certainly be the minimal one by
assigning mild restrictions to be much more likely outcomes than heavy restrictions.
The damage done, or by switching the sign, the (negative) benefit, is
− b2) = d · 2
3
r · f
f + p
+ d rest.loss ·
(
p
(
1− 2
3
r
)
+
2
3
r · p
f + p
)
, (20)
where we used the notation d rest.loss for the cost of the restrictions.
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9 Conclusion and outlook
We have discussed in this article two major topics in connection with our previously
proposed model with the action assumed to be complex.
The first of these subjects could have been considered starting from the trou-
bles of EPS problem the Bell’s theorem which states that quantum mechanics makes
predictions in the case of entangled particles being measured on that are in disagree-
ment with seemingly very reasonable assumptions. There is however as noticed by
Bell himself a way out for quantum mechanics if one makes use of that for given
initial conditions the measurements which the experimentalists at the two discussed
significantly separated positions A and B in the Bell or EPS experiment perform
is already in principle determined by determinism of at least say classical approxi-
mation physics. This deterministically determined choice of experiment being per-
formed namely makes the need for discussing simultaneously several possible choices
( by “free will” so to speak) irrelevant. In our complex action model this point may
be more stressed since the initial conditions are even in principle calculable.
However, we believe that it is NOT this true superdeterminism which makes our
model with the complex action more able to cope with the Bell’s theorem problem,
but rather the fact that our model predicts that the measurement results depend on
the happening in the future! It is this backward causation property of our model
which makes the assumption of no signal going faster than the speed of light being
a prerequisite for Bell’s theorem not trustable in our model. The point is that if
the future can influence the past by making an adjustment of the initial conditions
or by as is here relevant influence the outcome of a measurement, then a genuine
signal coming along with less than speed of light from A to B is not needed. Instead
we can have an effect from the future which is influenced by a signal from A. But
if one can wait to get the signal to somewhere in the future of course there is no
need for the signal reaching along faster than light. It has time enough to reach
the future, just influence can go backward in time there is no hurry to get the
signal along. Actually we found that our model essentially reproduces in a second
quantized version in principle calculable classical fields which can be identified with
the wavefunctions including echoes from future in the transactional interpretation.
To our model is with respect to the essential picture identical to the transactional
interpretation model, although we do not have exatly the Feynman-Wheeler time
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reflection invariant emission exactly. Rather our influence from future is determined
by parameters in the imaginary part of the action.
Thus we claimed that actually the Bell’s trouble calls for the influence from
future effect, and thus one should really attempt to look for such backward in time
influences whenever some new region of physics is being explored. Using our special
model of complex action the obvious place to look for such effects namely the at a
given time highest energy accelerator gets especially suggested. So we should look
for such effects by means of LHC.
We have argued that it would be a good idea to perform our earlier proposed
experiment of generating some random numbers – by card drawing or by a quantum
random number generator, or even both ways – and letting them then be decisive
in applying restrictions on the beam energy and/or the luminosity and/or the like.
The main point was that our theory, referred to as “model with an imaginary
part of the action”, is indeed seen to be right if LHC is stopped by our proposed
game rather than if it just failed for some technical or political reason. The reason
for the suggestion of our model being right if the LHC were stopped by a random
number (card) game decision than by just a “normal” technical or political failure
is that it is very hard to estimate in advance how likely it is for a “normal” failure
of LHC to occur.
The greatest encouragement for performing the experiment without much hesi-
tation is the remark that whatever happens with our proposed experiment, it will, in
practice, seem to be a success or at least to be of no harm. The point is that in the
case of any restriction being imposed by the random numbers, we have, because of
the very fact of these random numbers being generated at all, obtained the shocking
great discovery that there is “backward causation.” Such a discovery of the future
influencing the present and past would be monumental. Consequently, we would be
very happy and it would be a fantastic success for the LHC to have caused such a
discovery!
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